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Jacobs, Francis/Corbett, Richard/Shackleton, Michael (1992) The European Parliament, London:Longman The Political System of the European Union. Powers & Influence.
-Perceived as weak traditionally, however powers have over the last twenty years. -Has influence over legislation in three ways through the legislative process, the budgetary process and some control & supervision of the executive. EP & Legislation. Can influence legislation (but not initiate). 1.Informal consultation at the draft stages. 2.Can adopt its own report, which the commission musty implement. 3.TEU (Treaty on European Union Maast.) granted the right to �request the commission� initiate legislation� for the purposes of implementing the treaty� requires a majority of MEPS. Of questionable effect low MEP attendance makes it hard to get majority, but an ability to initiate (indirectly) legislation. 4.1982 joint declaration to improve budgetary procedures. EP can add items to the budget, which the commission and council must implement (e.g. a regional aid program), it also can set the limit of funding to implement other legislation. 5.Must be in agreement with the commissions legislative plan (effectively it can remove the entire budget to a plan it doesn�t like.). 6.Co-decision and consultation. Essentially the EP must be consulted, even if its views are then ignored Isoglucose case (1980), the Court of Justice ruled that the Council of Ministers actions were illegal because they had not consulted the EP. This is a delaying, not veto power. 4 possible areas of interaction Consultation 1 reading with amendments. Co-operation (SEA) additional reading overruled by unanimous council decision Assent (SEA) approval, no amendments Co-Decision (TEU) potential veto on limited subject areas. Trouble with assessing influence over legislation. 1.A lot of influence either informal, or through closed door lobbying. 2.Some EP amendments are accepted in principle, but the technical details are refused. Trends in this area. 1.EP has become central in the bargaining process of new legislation. 2.Has a high success rate in getting amendments through (but are these more technical and therefore less important). Weaknesses as compared to a national assembly. 1.Not sovereign no constitutional legislative authority. -Limited ability to initiate legislation. -Decisions can be overturned by a unanimous vote in council of ministers. -Can be blocked by �creative inertia� the council doesn�t debate the EP�s recommendations and so doesn�t need to act on them until it can get a unanimous vote. 2.Council allowed to act �pending response� i.e. Initiate legislation without EP consultation, by time EP can react its power over legislation is substantially weakened. 3.Not fully consulted although in practice this is normally not a major issue (i.e. statutory instruments don�t require debate on the floor of the House.) Limited ability to direct EU external stance (exceptions accession treaties & certain int� agreements). 4.No formal requirement to be informed or consulted on some legislation. Consequently if it oversteps mark can be ignored. This can be viewed in two ways, a.) As an indicator of the deficit, b.) Technical subjects don�t require a full hearing and it merely mirrors national assemblies. Budgetary Powers. 1.Right to propose �modification� to the current expenditure. Requires QMV in the council to overturn judgement. 2.Propose amendment to non-compulsory areas of the budget (almost everything except CAP). Again council can overturn in QMV. 3.May reject a draft budget (IFF a majority of MEP�s in favour, and 2/3 vote.) These powers have been used more extensively since 1979, with direct election the EP has increased in legitimacy over the other institutions. These powers are especially important when dealing with the commission, less so with other institutions. The powers here are more useful however as leverage to ensure co-operation, than as actual formal powers. Control & Supervision of the legislative. In general (as with all assemblies) this power is hampered by the Executive protecting itself, and by the lack of specialist knowledge (in comparison to the commission�s civil servants). However 2 problems are specific to it a.) The EP must attempt to check the commission, which in some cases merely co-ordinates action between multi-level organisations. This logically adds to the problem of lack of information. b.) The blurring of roles between Commission, Council of Ministers and European Council allow them to pass the buck, and increase the difficulty of monitoring. Some power over the Commission. -Can censure the commission, and throw it out. -Return legislation if unsuitable. -Can watch and delay legislation in committees. Weak power over the Council of Ministers. -The member states are unwilling to allow the supranational aspect of the EP �checking� the C of M. Consequently powers here are deliberately kept weak. -Powers as regards some areas of EMU, and the CFSP & JHA pillars of TEU, non-existent due to the nature of debate. These require quick responses, and in the case of security logically debate must be kept quiet. -The makeup of the council is constantly changing. This makes it hard to build a consistent relationship. In addition the council depending on political climate can reduce info to the EP. -Limited points of contact these however have been successfully used to challenge the council of ministers e.g. plenary committees, informal attendance by ministers at EP committees. No control over the European Council. -EC totally inter-governmental and outwith treaties (and therefore competencies of the EP). -The EP is �wholly bereft of any supervisory power� (pg. 185) -The debate is carried out by high-powered individuals who have the power to ignore the EP, as they desire. -Any controls it does have are through practice and custom, not by treaty and so can be removed. Turnout. -Low turnout, which has fallen consistently since 1979. This weakens the democratic credentials and popular legitimacy of the EP. Why?
Party system. Federations are very weak, and have failed to inspire loyalty or even to effectively co-ordinate groups. This is due to the limited effect they have on policy, and to the limited rewards/ punishments. Party Groups. Normally 8 10, hard to gain a political cohesion between groups to form coalitions etc. Hard to maintain loyalty. No gov�t to be in, or attack. Limited rewards and little effective punishment for following the party line. National politics may force the actions of the members of a group. No consensus of action within group as ideology may differ from country to country. Quality of MEPs? Slightly higher turnover of MEP�s, but this isn�t significant enough to be a major problem.
Conclusion. Increasing in power.
Jacobs, Francis/Corbett, Richard/Shackleton, Michael (1992) The European Parliament, London:Longman -first and only multinational parliament -history of European Parliament (EP) -1952 assembly with 78 appointed members -1962 assembly decides to describe itself as EP -1972/1975 first time "budgetary authority" -1979 first direct elections -1987 Single European Act (SEA), increasing power for EP ("co-operation procedure") -1992 Maastricht Treaty ("co-decision procedure") -626 members, in case of further enlargement limit to 700 -three seats: Luxembourg, Strasbourg, Brussels -no uniform electoral system (f. e. different size of constituencies, proportional representation without/with preferential vote) -political structure: main groups -SOC Socialist Group (founded 1953) -EPP Group of European Peoples Party (conservative group, founded 1953) -LDR Liberal, Democratic and Reformist Group (founded 1953) -other groups: United European Left, Greens, European Democratic Alliance, Rainbow Group, European Right -main work of EP is done in committees -20 standing committees, and ad hoc committees -possibilities of EP: consultation procedure, one single reading -EP is asked for an opinion, than Council take decision, often used for procedurally manoeuvre -co-operation procedure: second reading, can reject with absolute majority, but: no vetoes -co-decision procedure: similar to co-operation procedure but the EP can veto legislative proposals -increased power of the EP, but still weaker the Council and Commission The Political System of the European Union. 2 central processes of representative democaracy. 1. Party competition, 2. Elections. -In Eu operate hand in hand. -Competitive party democracy at European Level remains in the future. -Most commentators on democratic deficit argued 1. EP should be directly elected. 2. Should be given process and in selection of Commission power in the EU legislative. -As a result direct elections introduced in 1979, 5 year term.
Therefore they viewed the democratic deficit as closed but not really. The democratic deficit will remain unless :
i.political parties compete in EP elections over issues on the EU policy agenda and/ or for EU political office. ii.Voters make a choice in EP elections on basis of these rival policy platforms of candidates. iii.The winning electoral choices are translated into legislative and executive action (a mandate) at European level via cohesive political parties.
Party System.
-parties are central to relations between EU institutions and between nationals and EU levels. -Parties pursue 2 political goals : A) Political office which in the EU key political office is National Government. Despite growth in the EU�s role in areras of public policy, National Governmental office means leaders control public policy especially on education, health and housing. B) Policy- as promised in the manifesto, secured through outputs from National and EU decision making promises.
Therefore democracy in the EU depends on how parties secure these goals. The lack of togetherness in EU parties e.g. Socialists, Christian Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives differentiate themselves from one another (not by what we are, but what we are not). P. 167
-So far in the European political competition has been between those for further integration and those who favour less integration. -EU policy making is encroaching traditional areas of domestic political competition will be between left and right wing politics. -Divisions occur in party groups on the issue of sovereignty/ integration. -Politics in the EU is dominated by political parties who seek political office at national level and policy outputs from national and EU decision-making. -Policies pursued by parties in the EU arena are devised from the positions of the historical party faculties which are defined on the left-right issues and are internally divided on integration. -Left and centre-right blocs copulkd be constructed in the European arena, but this structuere of competition requires a predominance of the left- right issues on the EU agenda, and neither of these blocs are likely to be able to construct majority support.
Party Behaviour
-European parliament groups have been relativity successful in organising behaviour of MEP�s. -Many scholars hope that European Parliament elections would provide a new legitimacy for the whole EU project. -European elections are about national political issues, national political parties and the fight for national government office (Reif & Schmidt 1980) -European elections are seen as a way of measuring curerent support for the present government and many voters see these elections as having little impact in European politics. -European elections are still fought by the exisitng national parties.
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